Comments by Pointout

We must be missing something big here.

Under the terms agreed and signed, Greece has the chance to get EUR 9,000 worth of debt per inhabitant forgiven. In addition, they stand to get access to some 15,000 EUR per head of fresh funding. To access these goodies, they are asked to stick to an austerity program that will bring the deficit down quickly, but gradually.

As an alternative, they stand to get no debt forgiveness at all, no fresh funding, and an ejection from the credit markets that will force them to bring the deficit to zero instantly.

And yet they seem ready to vote for precisely such alternative. How on earth can it be? What is it that we are missing?

As a bystander, I can't help thinking that Greeks may just be blinded by their desire to kick the pants of their old-establishment politicians. The trouble is that all the new faces they end up voting for, happen to campaign against the agreement.

As a fellow European, I can only hope that Greek voters will be wise enough in the upcoming election to put aside their (however entirely understandable) rage for a moment, and realize what they are about to get themselves into.

Make no mistake, the choice is clear. On June 18th Greece will either be with the heart of Europe, or else merely somewhere in the vicinity of Syria.

Instructions:

First of all cleanse a rock from its original population (forcibly transferred to a nearby town, where the original Gibraltar flag is kept to this day), then populate it with colonists, and finally give the new colonists jobs in the occupying armed force, in shady lucrative offshore financial dealings, or possibly both.

Now you can consider yourself fully equipped to hold a referendum, get a Bulgarian-style result and yet boast to the world about quintessential democratic virtues. It is very likely that someone will buy your story.

You just need to keep in mind that human IQ appears to be distributed in a Gauss-bell type of shape.

Please add figures rather than rely on stereotyping.

The EU's net contribution to Spain was EUR 1bn in 2009, i.e. a mere 9 EUR per inhabitant, for the full year. That's a statistic fact (so much for "years of EU subsidies").

Spain's exports of goods and services grew 15% in 2011. Spain's inflation is now lower than the Eurozone average. Spanish facilities of many foreign companies are state of the art (i.e. Opel's largest and most efficient plant is precisely the one in Spain). Please elaborate at to why established companies would withdraw from the country any time soon.

Coming to the essence of your comment, it is sadly true that education is wanting, but one reason for that may just be that public-sector teacher's unions have been pampered with some of the shortest working hours in their field internationally, as well as with salaries and job security conditionss that compare very favourably with any other industry in the country.

It may not be more investment into education that is needed, but rather the introduction of far more operating discipline, and private-sector level-headedness that might work wonders for the country's long term prospects.

Practical actions have practical consequences.

President Fernández has not nationalised a strategic industry, but rather a single company, admittedly the biggest, but by no means the sole oil operator in Argentina.

She has not taken the company, but rather only the shares in it owned by one shareholder, again the largest but not the sole one.

The action of grabbing assets from their owner is contemplated under the criminal codes of most jurisdictions. Organizations that plot and execute such schemes, and then split the boot betweeen the participants, are well known in places such as Sicily.

In practice, there will inevitably be retaliation by Spain, Argentina's main foreign investor (26% of total), and one with whom Argentina has (or maybe "had") a sizeable commercial surplus (soybean and meat).

Further, the European Union may join Spain to some extent, possibly to the annoyance of Argentina's Mercosur partners.

While supportive Peronist politicians and trade unionists may now look forward to promising golden retirements in Miami, the ordinary Argentinos they leave behind are unlikely to be able to duck the medium-term consequences of their rulers actions.

One thing Mrs Fernández has surely closed for good is the on-going debate in Madrid, as to whether Santiago is a better Latam base than Buenos Aires (or New Palermo, if you will).

Thank you for this article.

This week Israel attacked the Palestinians in Gaza, confident on the technical prowess of its shiny new Iron Dome anti-missile defence. In the event, even though Iron Dome held well indeed, Jerusalem jews ended up torn all the same, having to witness the funerals for the victims of islamic terrorism's latest tactic, the lone-wolf gunman.

This is doubly sad for those who think that Israel may be wasting the best chance it has ever had to negotiate a fair settlement with the Palestinians, from a position of relative strength.

The trouble is that what relative strength does in the context of a negotiation, is to allow the stronger party the luxury of being generous. And this is a luxury that Israel looks at present all to happy to do without.

Confident on the support it receives from its US-based kin, Israel jews seem worlds away from sparing the smallest thought for any genuine Palestinian grievance. The news that a 13 year old Palestinian boy was killed by the Israeli strike on Gaza was quickly dismissed as inevitable collateral damage, fullstop.

This being the case, it is relieving to get the feeling that some genuine friends of Israel seem to share some urge to scout America's jewish political horizon for any signs of potential change, with J-Street turning up as the most significant option.

Still, the conclusion permeating from the article is that J-Street, no matter how interesting, seems years, perhaps decades, away from having any actual significance.

That's too bad. Let's hope we are wrong.

For the general benefit of a livelier debate, as well as possibly in order to remain open to the individual enjoyment of a rich two-way flow of opinions, I find it is better sticking to the merits of the ideas discussed. The assumption that no author ever writing a comment will be clever enough to detach himself from bias, looks pessimistic and sad.

Coming to your point, I do believe the examples quoted in the comment are relevant indeed. The Madrid region is the Spain's largest by GDP (since 2010), as well as the Madrid municipality has been the largest in the country for a long time.

Examples can surely be produced of spendthrift PP governments (notably Valencia's), it is the case indeed that when Rajoy looked for a Secretary of State for Public Administrations, i.e. the man in charge of enforcing austerity downstream on the wayward regional governments, he picked none other than Mr Antonio Beteta, straight out of the Madrid regional government, as a well-proven, safe pair of hands.

While it is surely impossible to convince every critic, Mr Rajoy does seem credible when he speaks about cutting the deficit. And, on the face of it, he surely has gained access to some goodwill in Brussels and Berlin.

The article is spot-on on the fact that Rajoy got remarkably little backlash from Brussels and Berlin over his alleged rebellion.

I however find a bit disappointing the explanation as to why Rajoy avoided a more severe rapping. The answer is that he is credible, a rare but valuable virtue in this circumstance.

For a starter, Rajoy's personal track record includes his participation in the government of the nineties, one that managed to push through the strict austerity package that landed Spain in the Euro in the first place.

He may then find it quick to get his party behind him. Most local observers are familiar with the fact that Madrid's regional government, under management of Mr Rajoy's party, was the only one among its 17 peers to in effect meet the 2011 deficit target. Not only, but the Madrid city municipality, also run by the PP, happened to end 2011 actually with no deficit at all.

And finally, coming to more recent behaviour of the man himself, even critics acknowlkedge that Mr Rajoy started his present mandate dictating an immediate tax rise, despite the great unpopularity of such move.

It is against this background that he promised to deliver a public deficit reduction equivalent of 2.7% of GDP, in the context of a recession forecast of -1.7% of GDP and with an unemployment rate already at a record-setting 23%.

He then went on to add that the budget to attain such goal would be introduced by the end of March, i.e. a mere 3 months after he took office.

And he finally ended by making a personal (i.e. not inherited from his predecessor) commitment to still reach the agreed 3% target in 2013 all the same.

Does it now look that the appropriate response to this stance by Brussels and Berlin would have been to drag him immediately in front of a firing squad?

As you see, just add a little background, and suddenly Brussels and Berlin may start to look way less mysterious, shady and foreign.

Excellent article. Good substance and prime narrative. The kind of stuff that has kept me fascinated with The Economist for so long.

Congratulations to Lexington.

May I just highlight I haven't actually blamed Catalonia for anything at all, as you are welcome to observe.

Just read any day's data release on the matter. For instance, while Madrid-based Iberia was allowed to merge with British Airways, Catalonia embarked on an ill-considered attempt to build a regional government-sponsored attempt to set up a flag airline carrier. The airline, called Spanair, collapsed 2 weeks ago, not before having burnt through over MEUR 200 of taxpayer money (plus an additional MEUR 8 rival Ryanair received after it complained about unfair subsidies).

Perhaps thanks to avoiding any such scheme, the Madrid regional government is hiring more teachers this year, while Catalonia's can't afford any. All this while the Madrid residents pay out a way larger proportion of their income as subsidies to poorer regions (tax data show that the amount of income tax per head collected in Madrid is about twice as large as the one in Catalonia).

And then again, maybe as a consequence of keeping their eye on the ball rather than on headline-grabbing distractions, it was published today that Madrid's regional GDP grew 1,4% in 2011, that is twice the nationwide rate.

Isn't it fair to ask where is it written that Catalonia would be better served economically by lowering its influence over the rest of Spain to the level it currently enjoys on the likes of Corsica, Tuscany or Sicily?

I am merely putting forward a modest call for cool-headed political decision-making, which I understand will of course not be heeded by some. Still, it seems Catalans as well as other Spaniards would similarly benefit from it.

May I just highlight I haven't actually blamed Catalonia for anything at all, as you are welcome to observe.

Just read any day's data release on the matter. For instance, while Madrid-based Iberia was allowed to merge with British Airways, Catalonia embarked on an ill-considered attempt to build a regional government-sponsored attempt to set up a flag airline carrier. The airline, called Spanair, collapsed 2 weeks ago, not before having burnt through over MEUR 200 of taxpayer money (plus an additional MEUR 8 rival Ryanair received after it complained about unfair subsidies).

Perhaps thanks to avoiding any such scheme, the Madrid regional government is hiring more teachers this year, while Catalonia's can't afford any. All this while the Madrid residents pay out a way larger proportion of their income as subsidies to poorer regions (tax data show that the amount of income tax per head collected in Madrid is about twice as large as the one in Catalonia).

And then again, maybe as a consequence of keeping their eye on the ball rather than on headline-grabbing distractions, it was published today that Madrid's regional GDP grew 1,4% in 2011, that is twice the nationwide rate.

Isn't it fair to ask where is it written that Catalonia would be better served economically by lowering its influence over the rest of Spain to the level it currently enjoys on the likes of Corsica, Tuscany or Sicily?

I am merely putting forward a modest call for cool-headed political decision-making, which I understand will of course not be heeded by some. Still, it seems Catalans as well as other Spaniards would similarly benefit from it.

Only convinced PP critics may agree with the point that "Valencia will be watched" when judging whether the PP government can be relied upon to re-establish financial sanity. In reality, everyone else expects the PP to make the cuts.
Despite the certainty of forthncoming economic pain, the prevailing sensation at the sight of a government that no longer can only procrastinate and fudge is deep relief.
On Catalonia, I would just point out it no longer is Spain's richest region. Madrid is actually richer both in per capita and, despite the smaller population, since 2010 in overall terms as well.
The Catalan government announced today its 2011 deficit was 3.3% of GDP, whereas Madrid's is so low the region is considering a tax cut. With Catalonia's education system designed to force the unwilling to learn Catalan, while Madrid's focuses on enabling the willing to learn English, there is scant expectation this trend will change any time soon.
And finally, it looks as if a fresh debate on Catalan independence was stirred every time the regional government fails to meet its budgetary goals. Catalan independentists seem to crave being represented in Madrid by an embassy rather than have their 47 MPs frequently hold the balance in Spain's Congress. They probably also seem to see Catalonia's natural area of economic expansion for Catalan companies away from Saragossa, Madrid and Valencia, and perhaps closer to Marseille, Palermo and Tunis.
So be it. But it may be worth it to spare a thought for consequences of the rising number of Catalan independentists... in the rest of Spain.

Mariano Rajoy is all too experienced in dealing with eleventh-hour Socialist pre-election stunts. He has in fact presided twice over election defeats closely linked to the Socialist party' ability to score decisive points at the last minute (on terrorism and the economic crisis, respectively). He is thus concentrating on avoiding any mistakes that could provide his rivals with a similar opportunity in this case.

Nor does he need to take any risks. Not only is the PP 15 percentage points ahead of the Socialists, but newscasters act as ir the ran the election campaign on behalf of his party. In fact, not a day goes by without one further piece of depressing economic data being released, or one more corruption scandal emerging.

This week, for instance, the aggregate job-destruction figure for this legislature climbed past the 2,000,000 mark, and the Socialist minister José Blanco, who runs as candidate in these elections, was reprted by a local judge to the Supreme Court for investigation on accounts of corruption.

In addition, Rajoy has the advantage of being able to point to his party's record in government at the regional level. With the probable exception of the Valencia, a very difficult region where the party has painfully undergone a series of purges to gradually rid itself of corrupt cliques, its performance compares quite favourably with that of rival parties.

In the showcase instance of Madrid, the PP has presided over the attainment of the number 1 slot in terms of GDP in 2010, despite the region's population being smaller than that of either Andalusia or Catalonia. All while keeping a balanced budget, and going on to consistently winning over 50% of the regional vote.

So when asked about his plans by journalists eager for headline fodder, Rajoy always has an easy, low-key reply at hand: "We will do as we do in Madrid". No risks, thank you.

May I highlight that, in reality, ETA has actually not disbanded. Nor has it relinquished a single one of the 350 guns it stole as recently as October 2006 (2 of them have hitherto been retrieved by the police), let alone any of its more powerful killing gear. It has neither turned in any part of its outstanding cash stack.

Further, the organization has apparently taken the precaution to appraise how long it can survive in the absence of any extorsion revenue. An internal ETA document, retrieved by the police and dated 2009, calculated ETA needed a yearly MEUR 4 to keep its infrastructure going.

In the May 2011 local elections, its latest political incarnation, called Bildu, obtained control of institutions managing an aggregate 5.6 billion EUR annual budgets. In order to assess the importance of Bildu's power grab, it should be noted that similar parties had never made it past the 0.3 billion EUR aggregate budgets mark before.

It is up to one's own reckoning to assess how easy, or difficult, it may be to belatedly divert MEUR 4 from 5.6 billion EUR administrative budgets. It must however be recalled that claims were made in the past that ETA had already done this, in that occasion via a Basque-language promotion entity called AEK.

Bildu's roaring success was made possible thanks to the clearance of its candidature given by Spain's Constitutional Court. This was contentious, as the country's Supreme Court had previously ruled that Bildu was, as an arm of ETA, banned from office by law.

In the event, the Constitutional Court overruled the Supreme Court after a 6-to-5 vote, where each of the 6 judges voting in favour happened to be a Socialist Party appointee.

ETA's long-rumoured communiqué was then made public exactly one month ahead of the general elections in Spain. Whether this was timed to give a fillip to the electoral fortunes of the Socialist party, on a quid-pro-quo basis, is anyone's guess.

The Socialist party was, however, ready to take the point-scoring occasion. Yesterday, José Blanco, minister for Civil Works, felt no embarrassment in going ahead and claiming that Socialists had "brought an end of so many years of violence by ETA".

Of course, most of us will agree that having ETA announce they no longer seek to kill anyone is a good thing.

But having noted the information above, and still believing the announcement really does mark the end of ETA, would seem, to put it one way, a bit corageous.

Excuses are becoming tiresome.

Left-leaning analysts tend to emphasize circumstances arising prior to the advent of the current government (such as the 1998 Zoning Law or the advent of the Euro in 1999) for Spain's current trouble. That seems to cut less and less ice with all but the most faithful, as pre-election polls show every other day.

The 1998 Zoning Law, and the Euro, were all circumstances the previous government appeared to manage well enough, by keeping a tight grip on aspects of economic micromanagement.

Once the current government gained power, a party started. It was most obvious in the growth of bank credit to the private sector. Credit growth, which had been kept at a steady annual BEUR 100 over several years to 2004, was all of a sudden allowed to shoot up to over BEUR 350 in 2007. Wow.

A huge proportion of that credit was financed via foreign loans. Thus, the yearly current account deficit shot up from BEUR 27 to over BEUR 100. These were all very public figures, available to the government, or to anyone else to see all along.

Yet, when attention was brought to the unsustainability of the explosion of the foreign credit-fuelled growth, left-leaning economists fell over themselves to argue that foreign debt was an outdated, pre-Euro concept. No worries, keep partying, all thanks the Socialist government.

In November 2007, a full 3 months after the subprime crisis had suddendly locked Spanish banks out of the foreign covered-bond markets they had hitherto been relying upon, the premier Zapatero came out in public to ask banks to keep lending to real estate companies (yes, that's actual).

Yet some still claim it was somebody else's fault. Now, that is what one could call quite an amazing case of amnesia.

Despite all its recent trouble, Spain probably is country stronger than one would think.

The land has no great wealth of natural resources. Not just that it doesn't have mineral resources, but large swathes of it don't even have the luxury of sufficient water. It lived through its direst hour during the civil war in the 20th century, when it allowed its soil to become the battleground of choice for a wider ideological confrontation, with foreign powers merrily welcomed by both sides to help kill their neighbours.

But it has come a long way since. Like it or not, Franco brought stability, much as the Communist Party did to China later. After its international isolation was lifted in 1959, the regime presided over a huge economic modernization effort. The country then became a democracy, it then achieved access to the European Union markets by way of membership at a huge cost (the deal forced it to all but dismantle its existing industrial capacity in the 1980s). As a consequence of the extremely demanding EU access conditions (few favours), the last barriers to access to the European markets were dismantled only as recently as in 1993. Nothing came cheaply, or easily for Spain.

Collections from exports of goods and services came in at BEUR 50 in 1993. For all the country's trouble, in May this yeare they stod at over BEUR 300, and growing at a 14% rate over the previous 12 months. So despite all the rot at the top, an admirable country still works and performs beneath the crust of ineptitude.

The current government can boast not one positive economic accomplishment. Its supporters routinely rely on ever more elaborate diversion tactics when it comes to defending its economic record: it all was someone else's fault, and the members of the opposition are subject to petty personal criticism. The lack of any better points is apparent.

Nor is this a case of ideology. Few dispute much of the management record of past PSOE governments, who engaged Europe and laid the foundations to the transformation of some of the country's largest companies.

It's a case of plain bad government. Zapatero never had any proper job beyond politics, nor had he ever enjoyed any previous government experience. He shunned his party's best to surround himself with loyal, but heavily underprepared, accolytes. Many of the members of the Zapatero cabinets hadn't even made it through college, some could only boast being scions of Zapatero's friends, the president himself speaks no foreing languages.

The result was predictable. The president's first action in government was to bin the strict budget-balance limits the previous government had imposed on the regional governments, and then to indulge in finding ever more exotic ways of spending the spoils of the economic bonanza he inherited.

Then, when the collapse inevitably ensued, a ridiculous game of denial and blame started, lasting to this very pages.

It's a great country. It deserves better.

Please allow me to present a contrarian opinion: Mr Rajoy might doing the right thing. As is the case with all contrarian analysis, this piece will require some explanation.

Let's start with the background. The scale of the mess the current Spanish government has created is frequently understated. Look at 4 pieces of data:

1 - Net foreign debt jumped from BEUR 300 to BEUR 950 (the world's second largest)

2 - Prolonged denial resulted in a 2009 central government budget lunatically based on a GDP growth rate of 1% (the actual figure turned out to be -3.2% instead)

3 - The resulting abysmal, 11.1% of GDP public sector deficit has merely been trimmed to 9.2% in 2010

4 - Even that small cut has been thrown open to question when incoming new PP-led governments unearthed gaping holes in the regional finances last month. In one such instance, small Castilla - La Mancha was found to have piled up, on top of a BEUR 5.8 disclosed debt, an additional BEUR 2.6 worth of unpaid bills.

In this dire state of affairs bets are open as to what chances are there that Spain will in fact hit the way greater public-sector deficit reduction target slated for 2010 (from 9.2% to 6% of GDP). And this is what will land in Rajoy's hands if he does win the election indeed.

Then, there's the politics beyond the economy. While many Spanish voters do make a cool-headed judgement of the facts, a large chunk of them has repeatedly shown a puzzling willingness to vote to the politians willing to give only good news, no matter how detached from reality their stance might be.

This feature of real life probably is not peculiar to Spain alone, but it has been exploited over and over by the PSOE, to the continuing damage of the PP's election performance. During the last election, Mr Zapatero himself famously denied any crisis was coming, despite evidence that funding markets had been closed to Spanish banks for months, to great election success.

Having learnt from past mistakes, Rajoy has now taken every preacaution to avoid uttering any remarks that may give the still formidable PSOE-frirendly media munition to portray his party as no less than a band of blood-thirsty Doberman hounds (foreigners may be forgiven for not being aware this was actually the case in one famous PSOE campaign video).

And lastly, the case for giving bad news has some tendency to being overplayed. Albeit perhaps conveniently short of detail, Rajoy does make some disclosure about his plans for governement indeed. And make no mistake about this: his trade-union and political opponents are all too happy to give voters every additional detail (real or imaginary) about the scale of the strife ahead in case the PP does win the election. So quite few can make a credible claim of unawareness as to what a Rajoy government will do when in power. Likeable he may or may not be, but Rajoy is certainly predictable.

Let's keep one thing in mind: contrary to the case of Italy, a credible gevernment alternative is immediately available to Spain. Mr Rajoy enjoys ample business and markets trust, based on the evidence of solid, proven government track-record. The risk spread on the 10-yr Spanish bond fell below its Italian counterpart today, and it is a fair assumption that markets may keep relenting on Spain as a PP victory becomes more probable, and closer in time.

So rather than our usual longing for high-profile, headline-grabbing political posturing, affected parties would do well giving some thought to the possibility that the fact Rajoy is avoiding any mistakes might be less of a problem than a blessing.

A well-known joke by a late Spanish comedian described an absurdly funny phone conversation from a supposed navy officer to the supplier of a ship. Having just made a complaint about the perceived lack of quality of the boat, supposedly a submarine, which failed to come back to the surface during testing, the man learns from the supplier that the boat in question wasn't actually a submarine, but a frigate. At which point the officer can't help it but to reply: "No wonder it was so hard for us to sink it!".

Zapatero is pretty much perceived to be in a similar position as our navy officer. Having taken an economy which created 450.000 jobs per year, with no public-sector deficit, a small (2% of GDP) current account deficit and BEUR 300 net foreign debt, he managed (not without great effort) to turn it into one which destroys 200.000 jobs per year, has a 9.2% of GDP public-sector deficit, 5% of GDP current-account deficit and over BEUR 900 net foreign debt (the world's second largest).

This being the case, it is hard from abroad to fathom how much quiet satisfaction the announcement of early elections has provoked in Spain. A Financial Times article, for one, says that prominent businessmen in Spain make scant effort to disguise their want to see the back of Zapatero.

Recent visitors to the country may however be forgiven for considering the FT's comment as a considerable understatement. In reality, Zapatero's standing is so poor that for the last year or so it has been rather safe to assume that every cab driver, shop attendant or elevator co-passanger you may engage in casual conversation with, wants Zapatero to leave sooner rather than later.

And with some reason, too. Seven years after he was surprisingly propelled into office by the 2004 Madrid train bombings, voters feel his job record is the worst for any president in over three decades of democracy. And this is while Zapatero's supporters still control most of the country media, especially the politically powerful national TV channels.

Fortunately, under the crust of impossibly incompetent government, a strong country still seems to breathe. Export income collection in April and May 2011 beat historical records, and it is growing at a 15% rate. And that is with the Euro trading at historical highs.

So the basics to get the country going again appear to exist. That may be why Spain is sure it is sufficient for it to put in charge just about any navy officer who is wise enough to tell the difference between a surface frigate and a submarine.

Demagoguery would seem a bit of an understatement, having witnessed the plain facts.

Before:

March 2006 - PSOE member Miguel Angel Fernández Ordóñez is named Governor of the Bank of Spain, the country's banking industry regulator, by the PSOE-led government.

July 2006 - Defying the tradition that would have the opposition make this appointment, the PSOE government goes ahead and names José María Viñals as Vice-Governor of the Bank of Spain, thus giving the party full control of the country's banking industry regulatory authority.

October 2007 - José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, president of the government of Spain, publicly asks banks "not to close the mortgage taps" on real estate companies.

February 2009 - Mguel Sebastián, minister of Industry in the same government, publicly declares that "the government is running out of patience" with banks failing to lend generously enough.

After:

July 2011 - José Blanco, minister for Public Works at the PSOE government, states that "banks granted mortgages to many who couldn't pay them".

July 2011 (this grand finale you will really love) - At a press conference, Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba, then vice-president of the PSOE government, openly claims to wonder why banks granted mortgages to borrowers who couldn't afford to pay them.

The blatant absence of any pretence of consistency is so unashamedly egregious that it would be gloriously funny, were it not because all the people named here still hold their respective senior governmental positions and (even more distressingly) because Mr Rubalcaba is major candidate to govern the country, which happens to be a Eurozone member.

The Eurozone woould at the very least quite seem to need mechanisms allowing better filtering of its member countries' presidential candidates. You may call that political union, or just plain quest for common sense.

After a largely failed attempt of reform in the mid 1990s, PSOE has cruised through 2 full terms of near monopoly on power (both executive and judiciary) and media without even singling its funding practices as a source of concern.

Its problems have thus become so pervasive that, once the opposition finally does reach power, it is fair to contemplate an endgame similar to that which finished the hapless PSI in Italy.

In such scenario, Zapatero seems to be striving mainly to ensure his personal enjoyment of party protection once he leaves office, and some of its riskiest secrets emerge, by way of all but handing power to a grateful Mrs Chacón.

In order to really save the PSOE, Zapatero should start by actually trying to.

One can't help wondering how the article writer reached his apparently unsubstantiated conclusion about the intellectual skills of Mrs Chacón.

What is known to the public is merely that Mrs Chacón is married to Miguel Barroso, who happens to be Zapatero's closest media spinning adviser and that, perhaps for this reason, she has been widely regarded as being groomed by Zapatero as successor.

With regards to her actual record, she was named Minister for Housing in July 2007, just before the subprime crisis erupted the following month. At that point, the stream of foreign credit on which Spain's housing boom was based came to a sudden stop, real estate magnates started queueing at the La Moncloa presidential office, and Zapatero swiftly moved Mrs Chacón to the Defense Ministry. So not very much (nor particularly bright) about her 9-month tenure there.

When Mrs Chacón became Minister for Defense, she could boast no greater technical skill for the job than two short stints as member of an international group of observers to the Balkans when she was about 25.

It was next to impossible to avoid the thought that the circumstances really weighting on Zapatero's choice were those best besuiting the wife of a professional political spinster, that is, the fact she was a photogenically pregnant catalan woman (witness how our remarkably pliant correspondent finds himself unable to avoid highlighting these key job qualifications).

Once in the job (and no longer pregnant), Mrs Chacón has been allowed by the president to avoid the potential dangers of having to appear in public. Her rather apparent efforts to avoid the press (including one famous statement about her need for privacy, uttered nowhere else than in Parliament) have been the object of much discussion.

The press blackout could however be expecte to allow her to get on with work. In effect, she has produced just one major decision during her 3 years in her current position, a law on military careers which reached uncharted territory when it became the object of no fewer than a record-setting, 5.000+ individual legal challenges.

Now that Zapatero is no longer running for PSOE presidential candidate, one could be forgiven for expecting him to gently bow away. None of that. He is staying on as head of the PSOE party, with powers to oversee the primaries, vet the all-important candidate lists, and face a party congress only when power has been safely handed over to a pair of an otherwise potentially undeserving, but likely grateful hands.

Whether this kind of selection process is most likely to produce a candidate ideal to Spain, to the PSOE as a party, or to Zapatero individually is however open to question.